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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KAREN ADAMS and STATE OF UTAH, 
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
HOWARD H. ADAMS, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the Appeal by 
virtue of the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(2)(b). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an Appeal from the District Court Judgment and 
Decree from a domestic relations, Bureau of Recovery Services case. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Can the trial court award attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party in a domestic relations case under the facts and 
circumstances of the case on appeal? 
2. 'If issues were waived or not preserved or objections 
made at pre-trial by Appellant, can said issues be raised again at 
the time of trial by Appellant? 
3. Can issues or legal theories not raised in the 
pleadings, or presented at the time of trial be raised on appeal? 
4. In a domestic relations matter or a "frivolous" appeal 
Case No. 890690-CA 
Priority 14(b) 
can the Respondent be awarded attorney's fees and costs incurred? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statute is determinative in this case: 
Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-3 (1953) as amended. 
The Court may order either party to pay ... to 
enable such a party to prosecute or defend the 
action. 
The following rule is determinative in this case: 
Rule 16(b)(1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(b)(1) The formation and simplification of the 
issues, including the elimination of frivolous 
claims/ and defenses. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The proceedings started when Respondent was served with a 
Notice of Income Withholding by Appellant. Mr. Adams sought 
judicial review of the matter by filing an Order to Show Cause and 
served the same upon the Appellant (R. 25-30). Respondent sought 
judicial review of the Department's actions, asked for recognition 
of a stipulation entered into nine (9) months prior to the 
Department's involvement, sought relief from the threatened judgment 
and garnishment of his wages and an award of attorney's fees. 
The matter was then heard before the Domestic Commissioner 
who found in favor of Respondent with Appellant agreeing to the 
Recommended Order. Appellant then filed an objection to the Order 
without setting forth any basis for the objection. 
The objection hearing was held before the Honorable Douglas 
L. Cornaby on the 8th day of August, 1989 and pro offers made. The 
trial court turned the hearing into a pre-trial with the parties 
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agreeing and resolving all the issues before it except for 
attorney's fees, which issue was then set for trial. Appellant 
agreed with the trial court's resolution of the issue before it, 
failed to voice any objection and agreed that the sole issue for 
trial would be that of whether Respondent should be awarded 
attorney's fees and costs in this matter. At pre-trial the Court 
sustained the Domestic Comtissioner's recommendations (Transcript of 
Proceedings, August 8, 1989, P20 L5, R. 22 L22-25). 
The trial was heard on September 14, 1989 in which the 
District Court found that the Appellant had acted unreasonably in 
this matter and in bad faith; that the Respondent was forced to 
defend the Department's actions and was therefore awarded attorney's 
fees (R. 76-77, 79-81 and 82-83). 
Appellant appealed the trial court's decision (R. 86-87). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties, Karen Hatch Adams and Howard Adams were 
married to each other in 1975 and had two children from the 
marriage. On March 6, 1979 the parties were granted a Decree of 
Divorce, in which Mrs. Adams was awarded custody of the children and 
Mr. Adams was ordered to pay $100.00 per month per child as and for 
child support (R. 13-15) 
2. Prior to July, 1988, Mr. Adams rented a home that he 
owned to Mrs. Adams. The rental value of the home was $300-350.00 
per month. The parties agreed that in lieu of child support 
payments to Mrs. Adams, Mrs. Adams could stay in the hone without 
having to pay any rent (R. 23-24). Mr. Adams is employed as a 
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school teacher (Transcript of Trial Sept. 14, 1989, P38 L14). 
3. Mr. Adams had an attorney prepare the parties' 
Agreanent in writing and Mrs. Adams filed it with the Clerk's 
Office. The parties agreement was filed in their divorce file. Mr. 
Adams's Attorney did not prepare an Order so the parties' agreanent 
was not reduced to an Order (Transcript of Trial, Sept. 14, 1989, 
P44, L19-22). 
4. Mr. Adams became aware that the stipulation should have 
been reduced to an Order after discussing the matter with the 
Department (Transcript of Trial Sept. 14, 1989, P40 L7 - P41 L15). 
5. Mrs. Adams informed Welfare of the parties' agreement 
and furnished them a copy of the agreement before being allowed on 
assistance (Transcript of Trial, Sept. 14, 1989, P31 L10 - P32 L3). 
6. The Department knew about the parties' agreement prior 
to sending out their Advance Notice Income Withholding (Transcript 
of Trial, Sept. 14, 1989, P31 L10 - P32 L3; P39 Lll - 124). 
7. That the Department informed Mr. Adams that he had to 
comply with their findings of an arrearage for delinquent child 
support or his credit would be damaged and his wages garnished 
(Transcript of Trial, Sept. 14, 1989, P41 L8, L16). 
8. Mr. Adams believed that his credit would be damaged and 
his wages would be garnished by the Department (Transcript of Trial, 
Sept. 14, 1989, P41 L8, L16; P13 L13-L14). 
9. That Mr. Adams retained legal services because he did 
not believe that it was right for the Department to take such unfair 
action against him (Transcript of Trial, Sept. 14, 1989, P41 L16 -
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P42 Lll)• 
10. The Department was served with Notice and the Order to 
Show Cause hearing. That Mr. Carl G. Perry represented the 
Department at the hearing regarding Mr. Adam's Order to Show Cause 
which was heard before Maurice Richards, Domestic Commissioner 
(Domestic Hearing Transcript, June 29, 1989, P3 L4-10 R. 39-40). 
11. At the hearing, the Department waived any objection to 
the Court's recommendations and agreed to the recotmiendations of the 
Domestic Commissioner (Domestic Hearing Transcript P13 R. 40). 
12. That the Department filed an objection to the 
Recommended Order that was prepared, although it had indicated to 
Mr. Adams' attorney and the Domestic Commissioner that it agreed 
with the Court's recommendation (Dcxnestic Hearing Transcript, P13 
L7-13 R. 41). 
13. That the Department's objection was heard before the 
Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby on the 8th day of August, 1989. After 
listening to the attorneys' arguments and representations the 
parties agreed to treat that hearing as a pre-trial conference and 
set the matter for trial (Transcript of Proceedings August 8, 1989 
P20 L5). 
14. The sole issue which would be heard at trial would be 
whether the Department should pay attorney's fees to Mr. Adams 
(Transcript of the Proceedings August 8, 1989 P21 L22-P22 L2). At 
the hearing, the State waived any objections to the Dcxnestic 
Commissioner's recommendations and failed to reserve any issue for 
trial except attorney fees (Transcript of Proceedings August 8, 1989 
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P13 L2, P21 L22-25; See also Transcript of Trial, Sept. 14, 1989 P3 
L25; P6 L7; P47 L15; P50 L8-11; P71 L3-16). 
15. The Court found that Respondent was forced to bring 
this action because of the State acting in bad faith with "an 
endless supply of money unreasonably pressuring people without 
reason" (Transcript of Trial, Sept. 14, 1989 P67 L7-19). 
16. That Respondent was entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees in this case in the amount of $457.00 and costs incurred (R. 
85). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In a domestic matter the trial court may award attorney's 
fees under Section 30-3-3 UCA to any party based upon the court's 
determination of the case. In the instant case, Respondent was 
awarded $476.00 and costs pursuant to the trial court's finding that 
Appellant acted "unreasonably" and in "bad faith" after the court 
had carefully considered the evidence and facts to justify an award 
of attorney's fees. 
The Appellant waived or failed to preserve any other issues 
other than attorney's fees at the pre-trial hearing and could not 
raise said issues again at trial. Since all other issues other than 
attorney's fees were waived at pre-trial and were improperly raised 
at trial, it is improper for the Court of Appeals to hear those 
issues on appeal when they were not tried in the trial court. 
Therefore, all of Appellant's arguments numbered one through six 
should not be considered on appeal but dismissed as having been 
waived, abandoned or not properly preserved for appeal. 
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Further, that Respondent should be awarded his attorney's 
fees under Section 30-3-3 UCA because of the Department's 
unreasonableness in this matter, the frivolous nature of the appeal 
and in considering the economic pressures the Department has 
attempted by reason of the appeal to force Respondent to abandon his 
position in this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT HAS THE POWER TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES TO 
ENABLE A PARTY TO DEFEND AN ACTION. 
The trial court in a domestic relations matter has the power 
to award attorney fees to any party pursuant to Section 30-3-3 UCA 
1953 (as amended) "The Court may order either party to pay ... to 
enable such a party to prosecute or defend the action." 
In Kerr v. Kerr, Utah 610 P2d 1380 (1980) the Supreme 
Court has held that in a domestic proceeding the Court is empowered 
to award such sums as will permit opposing parties to bring or 
defend an action and the decision to make such an award, together 
with the amount thereof, rest permanently with the sound discretion 
of the trial court. In Kerr the Supreme Court went on to outline 
some considerations for the trial court to consider in making such 
an award, such as need, reasonableness and the relative ability to 
the respective parties to shoulder the expenses of litigation (see 
also Maughan v. Maughan, Ut App 770 P2d 156 (1989) which reaffirms 
trial court's power to award attorney fees and the power to award 
attorney's fees incurred with defending an appeal). 
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In the instant case, the State of Utah was joined as a party 
Plaintiff (Domestic Commission Hearing June 29, 1989 Pill L18-20). 
The State failed to object to the procedure, made their court 
appearances, never filed any motions raising the jurisdiction issue 
and sutaoaitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Court "waiving any 
defense which it might have accepted" (Transcript of Trial P50 Lll; 
P51 Lll). 
The Department was an assignee of Mr. Adams' former wife 
since its standing to be a party of interest rests under the theory 
that the custodial parent assigns her right to the State in exchange 
for welfare benefits. Therefore, the State assumes the custodial 
parent's position in such a proceeding and in the instant case. 
Therefore, since the Department had assumed the role of the 
former Mrs. Adams by reason of the assignment of her rights to child 
support, it allowed the trial court to have jurisdiction over it and 
would allow the trial court to order the Department to pay 
Respondent's attorney's fee under Section 30-3-3 UCA as in other 
domestic matters. 
The Court, after hearing various evidence such as what 
alternatives the Department could have taken, (Transcript of Trial 
P15 L15; Pi6 L2); the procedures which the Department could have 
followed (P15 Lll-24, P20 L10-P20 L16); what notice the Department 
had received (P21 L15-17; P25 Lll, P26 L19-23, P36 L13); the belief 
of the Respondent (P41 L8-10, P36 L19-23, P41 L3-10) the action the 
Department continued to take in this matter after it had agreed in 
the two previous hearings that Respondent owed nothing (P28 L13 -
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P30 LI) the relative economic strength of the various parties 
(Transcript of Trial P67 L9-11); the reasonableness of the 
Departments actions (p70 L2-17, P72 L3-22) and concluded that the 
Department's actions were "unreasonable" and in "bad faith" and that 
they should pay sane of Respondent's attorney's fees in the amount 
of $476.00 and costs (R. 84-85). 
It should also be noted that the Appellant's continuance to 
raise the same issues over and over again after waiving than 
previously and agreeing with the Respondent's position in the two 
previous hearings (Domestic Commissioner Hearing P12 L16- P13 L12; 
Hearing August 8f 1989 R. 71 L22- R. 72 L2; Transcript of Trial P4 
L13 - P5 L15, P6 L9-18, P7 L14 - P7 L5, P50 L8-11). The trial court 
based upon the evidence and the findings and conclusions of law did 
not err in awarding Respondent attorney's fees in the amount of 
$476.00 and costs. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT COULD HAVE ALSO AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES UNDER THE 
FACT AND CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE INSTANT CASE PURSUANT TO SECTION 
78-27-56 OCA. 
Section 78-27-56 allows the prevailing party to be awarded 
attorney's fees when the Court finds the action or defense is 
"without merit" and it was "not brought or asserted in good faith". 
Under the circumstances of the instant case, the Court found that 
the State's action in this case were "unreasonable" and "asserted in 
bad faith" (R. 85). The trial transcript supports the award of 
attorney's fees. The Court at the time of trial advised the State's 
Attorney that the only issue to be resolved was an award of 
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attorney's fees; that all of the other issues were resolved in the 
previous hearing. The State, however continued to argue the issues 
which it had waived at the time of Pre-trial hearing and had not 
preserved for trial. Also the Court at the time of Pre-trial 
advised the State that if the evidence supported the fact that the 
State had notice of the parties' agreement prior to sending out 
their Notice to Respondent it would award attorney's fees to 
Respondent for the extra hearings (R. 14 L5-17/ R. 19 L6-19). 
The Court found that the State had been given notice (R. 83 
L6). Further it found that the State had continued to ignore the 
Trial Court's order and continued to threaten garnishment of 
Respondent's income, even after the State had agreed that no money 
was owed by Respondent (R. 84 L10-12). 
The State continued to press its casef even after it had 
stipulated to the outcome in two previous proceedings (R. 85-86). 
The record is clear that the State agreed with the Domestic 
Commissioner's recommendations but objected to all issues, when 
the only issue was attorney's fees. The record is clear that the 
State agreed with the position of the Trial Courts and waived any 
objection to it, preserving the sole issue of attorney's fees for 
Trial. Although the Trial Court failed to express a finding of 
"without merit" the Court expressed this position on several 
occasions throughout the proceedings (R. 84, 85). 
The Court did not err in an award of Attorney's fees in this 
matter. An award of attorney fees was proper even under Section 
78-27-56. 
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POINT THREE 
ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS "WAIVED, NOT OBJECTED TO OR ELIMINATED 
AT A PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE CAN NOT BE RESURRECTED AT THE TIME OF 
TRIAL. 
Rule 16, U.R.C.P. allows the Trial Court to conduct 
pre-trial conferences upon its own discretion. At the conferences 
the Court may consider: 
"(b)(1) The formation and simplification of the 
issues, including the elimination of frivolous 
claims, and defenses." 
Utah courts have long held that issues and legal theories not 
preserved at pre-trial conferences are deemed waived or abandoned at 
the time of trial Parker v. General Motors Corp., 503 P2d 148, 28 
UT 2d 385, DiEnes v. Safeco Life Ins. Co., 442 P2d 468, 21 UT 2d 
147; Citizens (as Co of N.Y.) v. Hackett, 410 P2d 767, 17 OT 2d 
304; Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc. v. Lords, 460 P2d 321, 
23 UT 2d 152; Youngren v. John W. Lloyd Construction Co., 450 P2d 
985, 22 UT 2d 207; Rumay v. Salt Lake City, 400 P2d 205, 16 UT 2d 
310. 
In the instant case, the objection hearing of August 8, 1989 
was deemed to be a Pre-trial by agreement of the parties (R. 70 
L5-7). The Trial Court narrowed the issue which would be tried to 
that of whether Respondent was to be awarded attorney's fees (R. 71 
L21; R. 72 L3). Appellant failed to preserve any other issue for 
Trial. In fact, Appellant agreed with the Trial Court's conclusion 
and disposition of all other issues (R. 71 L21 - R. 72 L3). By not 
objecting to the Court's determination of the issues at Pre-trial 
the Appellant waived its right to raise these issues again at Trial. 
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The Appellant never filed any pleadings in this case, either in 
response to Respondent's Order to Show Cause Affidavits or raised 
any issues or grounds for its filing of its objection to the 
Recommended Order of the Domestic Commissioner or filed any motions 
prior to Trial to frame any issues (Record). 
The Trial Court even recalled that the sole issue preserved 
for Trial was attorney's fees and who should pay them (Transcript of 
Trial P3 L25 - P6 L7). The Court allowed, over the objection of 
Respondent, the Department to re-argue these issues because it did 
not have before it a record of the prior proceedings, and allowed 
the State's Counsel to present other arguments which had been waived 
at Pre-trial as a courtesy to Appellant's Counsel (Transcript of 
Trial P7 Lll - P8 L5) but essentially ruled that the State's 
arguments were not timely brought and rejected them (Transcript of 
Trial P50 L8-14), finding in favor of Respondent. 
Appellant, by not objecting to the Court's determination of 
the issues and agreeing with the Trial Court, waived its right to 
preserve these issues for trial and waived its right to have the 
Court consider them at the time of Trial, even though the Court, as 
a courtesy to Appellant allowed arguments in that regard to be made. 
The sole issue at the time of trial was attorney's fees and nothing 
more. 
POINT FOUR 
ISSUES OR LEGAL THEORIES NOT PRESENTED AT TRIAL OR WAIVED 
PRIOR TO TRIAL CAN NOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
It has been long established that defenses, issues and 
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claims not raised by the parties in the trial court can not be 
considered for the first time on appeal Edgar v. Wagnerf 572 P2d 
405 (1977); Mascaw v. Davis, 741 P2d 938 (1987); Lane v. Messen, 
731 P2d 488 (1984); James v. Preston, Ut App 746 P2d 799 (1987). 
In the instant case. Appellant would desire that this Court do 
precisely that and try the case at the appellate level. As 
presented in the previous argunent, the Appellant abandoned any 
right to have the Court re-hear the case by it failing to preserve 
the issues it is now presently placing before this Court to decide 
by reason of the State's appeal in this matter. 
I would submit that the only issue which is appealable 
before the Court is whether the trial court erred in awarding 
attorney fees to Respondent. Any other issue should be dismissed 
outright because that issue was waived at Pre-trial, and not tried 
at the time of Trial which has been already discussed in the 
previous points. 
I would suggest to this Court that arguments and issues 
raised in this appeal by Appellant in his brief numbered one through 
six were never tried by the trial court, that these arguments had 
been decided and resolved at pre-trial, that these same issues or 
arguments were abandoned or waived by the State at pre-trial and it 
would be improper for the Court of Appeals to consider them where 
they were not presented or preserved for trial and should not be 
considered appealable issues for this Court to consider. 
POINT FIVE 
THAT RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO BE AWARDED COSTS AND 
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ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED IN RESPONDING TO THIS APPEAL. 
Rule 33(a) and 40, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and 
this Court's previous decision in cases such as O'Brien v. Rush, 
Ut App 744 P2d 306 (1987); Topik v. Thunber, 739 P2d 1101 (1987) 
would allow this Court to award attorney's fees and costs for 
"frivolous" appeals. Additionally this Court has awarded attorney's 
fees and costs incurred on defending appeals under Section 30-3-3 
OCA as in such cases as Fife v. Fife, Ct App 777 P2d 512 (1989); 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P2d 1380 (1980); Maughan v. Maughan, Ut App 770 
P2d 156 (1989). It would be appropriate that this Court award 
Respondent his attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending on 
this appeal on either theory. 
The trier of fact suggested in his decision of the case as 
to why Respondent should be entitled to attorney's fees in this 
matter, the same reason which Respondent urges this Court to adopt 
as follows: 
There is no question that I'm irritated when 
I see a bureacracy that has an endless supply of 
money unreasonably pressuring people without reason. 
And thats what I see in this case. I see bad faith 
from beginning to end on behalf of the State. The 
Court amplored the parties at the last hearing to 
settle this because it was ridiculous to come back 
to this Court for a hearing just to determine who 
would pay attorney's fees. 
There is no question that ... the Defendant 
in this action, Mr. Adams, has been forced to bring 
this action (Transcript of Trial P67 L9-19). 
That this appeal is another attempt at pressuring the 
Respondent to concede to the State's position. It is clear the 
trial court can and does have the power to award attorney's fees 
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pursuant to Section 30-3-3 and 78-27-56 UCA. This Appeal by the 
Department is an unconscionable attempt by appeal to delay the 
imposition of the award of attorney's fees and cost and to pressure 
economically Repondent to roll over and play dead under the guise of 
an appeal of issues which were waived at pre-trial which have been 
continually resurrected at every hearing held previously and then 
abandoned by the State* 
The Courts must address the issue and preserve the balance 
between the power and resources of the Department verses the limited 
resouces of the individual as this case represents. An award of 
Respondent's attorney's fees and costs incurred is a necessity to 
preserve such a balance. The trial court again stated: 
The State has agreed to the Court today that 
they have not — that they're just a party to this 
action because they are kind of forced into it and 
they would not have pressured. 
But the testimony clearly is that Mr. 
Coombs, clear up through even after this last 
hearing date on August 6th would still have gone 
ahead with taking a garnishment for these monies. 
So obviously they were using that pressure of the 
government without reason, without thinking. 
Counsel says it's bad faith and the State's 
Counsel says there's nothing bad faith about it. 
It's bad faith from the beginning to [the] end. 
This whole action is bad faith of having to defend 
it by the Defendant." 
Respondent- would hope that this Court would agree with the 
Trial Court and award to him his costs and attorney's fees incurred 
on appeal and sustain the trial court in this matter. 
CONCLUSION 
The only proper applicable issue for this Court to consider 
-15-
is the issue of attorney's fees. The Appellant at the time of 
Pre-trial abandoned, waived or stipulated away any other issue and 
only preserved the issue for trial of that of attorney's fees. 
The Trial Court may award attorney's fees under Section 
30-3-3 UCA in a domestic matter at its discretion. It also may 
award attorney's fees under Section 78-27-56 XA. The award of 
attorney's fees to Respondent was reasonable under the facts and 
circumstances of this case. 
That Respondent should be awarded his attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in defending this appeal because the Appeal is in bad 
faith and Respondent is entitled to be awarded his expenses under 
Section 30-3-3 XA. 
Respectfully submitted this day of May, 1990. 
SCOTT W. HOLT, Attorney for 
Defendant-Appellant 
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